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In an anarchic corner of northern Kenya in the mid-1990s, a collection of local non-state actors 
led by a women’s market group created an umbrella movement that came to establish an impres-
sive level of peace and security across an entire region. The Kenyan government forged a formal 
relationship with this group in Wajir, essentially sub-contracting out important functions of local 
government to local civic leaders, and using its partnership with the Wajir group as a template for 
similar state-sanctioned governance arrangements in other troubled border areas of the country. 
The Wajir story is examined in this article as an example of a “mediated state” approach to rebuild-
ing rule of law through non-state actors in a conflict and post-conflict setting.
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  Introduction
An intriguing but largely overlooked transformation in governance and security has 
taken place in northern Kenya over the past decade, one which has implications for alter-
native state-building approaches in zones of state failure.
In the early to mid-1990s, the Somali-inhabited portion of northern Kenya was one 
of the most insecure and ungoverned zones of the Horn of Africa. The Kenyan govern-
ment had never established a strong presence in this isolated and impoverished frontier 
zone, and when it ended a long period of emergency rule there in the early 1990s, its ca-
pacity to impose basic governance declined even further. Spillover from the Somali civil 
war and state collapse produced a massive flow of refugees, small arms, violent criminal-
ity, and clan tensions in northern Kenya. Local Somali Kenyans were essentially on their 
own, trying to cope with serious deterioration of security in their home areas. 
By the late 1990s, the security and governance climate in much of northern Kenya 
had improved dramatically. Violent crime, including livestock raiding, was rare; towns 
were safe; regional commerce flowed with minimal risk of banditry; communal clashes 
were prevented or quickly managed; and cross-border diplomatic initiatives with com-
munities on the Somali side of the border successfully reduced spillover of lawlessness 
and conflict into northern Kenya. A major clash between the Garre and Marehan clans afrika focus — Volume 21, Nr. 2 [ 24 ]
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at the border town of El Wak in 2004 constituted a troubling setback in this trend, but it 
was the exception that proved the rule. Overall the region was not only much safer than 
before, it was arguably safer than the rest of Kenya. According to a public opinion survey 
conducted by Afro-barometer in 2006, its residents reported less crime and less fear of 
crime than any other region of Kenya.
This dramatic turnaround in northern Kenya was not due to a robust Kenyan gov-
ernment initiative to reclaim control over the territory. Its physical presence and capac-
ity to govern in the region remains weak; the only major improvement has been in its 
US-backed military patrols of the border since 2006, in response to renewed political 
crisis and threat of spillover from neighboring Somalia.  Instead, the improvement in 
governance and security has emanated from coalitions of non-state actors in the local 
community who have formed hybrid systems of governance in partnership with the Ken-
yan state.
These informal governance and security arrangements, and the willingness of the 
Kenyan government to treat them as partners rather than rivals to be marginalized or 
tools to be manipulated as a form of “indirect rule,” are the subject of this article.  North-
ern Kenya constitutes one of the most interesting cases of the rise of “mediated state” ar-
rangements in contemporary Africa, and raises a host of questions about the advisability 
and feasibility of the mediated state model as either a temporary coping mechanism or a 
long-term alternative approach to reviving rule of law in failed states.
  A Troubled Region 
The instability which periodically plagues the Kenya-Somalia border area is part 
of a broader, complex pattern of state failure and communal violence afflicting much 
of the Horn of Africa. Violence and lawlessness are particularly acute in remote border 
areas where states in the region have never projected much authority. When they have, 
state authorities have sometimes been the catalysts of insecurity rather than promoters 
of peace.  On the Somali side of the border, the central government collapsed in Janu-
ary 1991 and has yet to be revived.1 In Kenya, the vast, remote, and arid frontier areas 
bordering Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Uganda were never entirely brought under the 
control of the state in either colonial or post-colonial eras.  Thousands of Kenyans have 
died in periodic communal violence in these border areas over the past fifteen years, in 
clashes which sometimes produce casualties levels normally associated with civil wars. 
Kenyan government administration of its peripheral territory ranges from weak to non-
existent. There, government outposts are essentially garrisons; police and military units 
are reluctant to patrol towns after dark, and are badly outgunned by local militias.  “Even 
the police are never safe here,” lamented one Kenyan newspaper headline in reference to 
Kenya’s northern provinces.2
The broader nature of the crisis of Kenya’s border areas was made painfully clear 
1  A Transitional Federal Government was declared for Somalia in October 2004 but has yet to become opera-
tional.   
2  “Even the Police Are Never Safe Here,” The East African Standard (July 17 2005). Accessed via Lexis-Nexus.afrika focus — 2008-12 [ 25 ]
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in July 2005, when tensions between the Gabra and Borana in Marsabit, Kenya (near the 
Ethiopia border) exploded in what some observers claim is the single worst incident of 
communal violence in the history of post-colonial Kenya. The massacre at Marsabit re-
sulted in over 90 Gabra deaths and 9,000 displaced persons. It also produced an outburst 
of soul-searching in the Kenya media and parliament over “Kenya’s killing fields” in its 
border regions and the costs incurred for the failure of the government to extend its au-
thority into what many Kenyans still refer to has the country’s “frontier.”3 “That hundreds 
of armed criminals can terrorize a town for hours without the intervention of the coun-
try’s security forces is a clear indication that the government has little or no authority in 
the North Eastern region,” argued the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC).4
  The Wajir Case: Conflicts of 1992-93 and 2000-01
Wajir district is shared by a number of Somali clans, principally the Ajuraan, Dego-
dia, and Ogaden. The Ajuraan consider themselves to be the “original” inhabitants of 
much of the land, and enjoyed protected access to Wajir-West under the British colonial 
system. Since independence they have faced long-term migratory pressure and changing 
demographics from westward-expanding neighbors, especially the Degodia (Goldsmith 
1997: 30). The district has historically been almost entirely rural and pastoral, with only 
four settlements in the entire district in 1940. Today, there are 71 settlements, of which 26 
are new since 1996; a total of about 380,000 live in the district.5
Migratory pressures on the Wajir rangeland have been exacerbated by the firepower 
and changed clan demographics arising from the Somali civil war, and have led to en-
demic tensions between the three clans over rights to pasture and wells. Land pressure 
was worsened in the 1980s when the Degodia were pushed out of Isiolo district and into 
Wajir  by the Borana. Anxiety over land access is clearly a major underlying factor in dis-
trict conflicts.  But the clashes which erupted in 1992 and 1993 between the Degodia, 
Ajuraan, and Ogaden clans were triggered by the arrival of multi-party politics and com-
petition over MP constituencies. As noted above, these elections were viewed as high-
stakes, zero-sum contests by clans fearful that victory by rival clans would institutional-
ize the rival’s hold on resources and eventually disenfranchise the losers. In 1992, general 
elections led to heightened tensions in a number of electoral districts (“constituencies” 
in the Kenyan system) where two or more clans shared residency and where demograph-
ics were either shifting or were actively manipulated to produce a desired outcome for a 
clan and it’s MP candidate. 
In Wajir-West constituency, tensions between the Degodia and Ajuraan had already 
led to an alarming level of assassinations in the 1980s, rendering the area one of the 
most unstable in Kenya. In 1992, the demographically ascendant Degodia clan sought 
3  “Kenya’s Killing Fields,” The Nation (July 14 2005). Accessed via Lexis-Nexus.
4  “Thousands Flee as New Clan Attacks Hit Northern Kenya after Village Massacre,” Agence France Presse (July 
14 2005). Accessed via Lexis-Nexus.
5  Robert Walker and Hassan G. Omar, “Pastoralists Under Pressure: The Politics of Sedentarisation and Margin-
alisation in Wajir District, Northeast Kenya”  (Nairobi: Oxfam-GB, July 2002), pp. 9, 18. afrika focus — Volume 21, Nr. 2 [ 26 ]
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to increase its numbers by bringing in Degodia from outside the constituency to vote, in 
some cases even from Ethiopia. It won the seat, and the Ajuraan loss was seen as a sign of 
the declining fortunes of the Ajuraan. Degodia chiefs were subsequently appointed to an 
exploding number of new locations, thanks to the influence of the MP. For the Degodia, 
this was merely a function of time-honored political patronage by an MP in service to his 
base. For the Ajuraan, it appeared to be a large-scale, politically-sanctioned land grab at 
their expense. The ethnic clashes which ensued rocked much of Wajir district, spread-
ing to other clans and overwhelming local government. Violence even spread among the 
market women in Wajir town. From 1992 to 1995, a total of 500 businesses in Wajir were 
looted or destroyed; livestock estimated at a value of $900,000 were lost to rustling; and 
Wajir town  was nearly emptied of professionals and middle-class residents. During that 
period, 165 civil servants and teachers either left their posts or refused to go when as-
signed to Wajir (Ibrahim 1997). Wajir was the epicenter of the descent of much of North-
east Province into anarchy. 
What happened next is one of the more extraordinary turn of events in Kenya’s trou-
bled frontier violence, and is well-documented in print and now film.6 An initially small 
women’s civic group helped set in motion a peace process which eventually culminated 
not only in a relatively durable peace among the three main clans in Wajir, but also helped 
produce a new type of civic-government partnership for conflict management that went 
on to become a model for peace committees throughout much of Kenya.
Two women intervened to stop the market violence. The Wajir Women for Peace 
Group was formed out of those talks, which expanded to include other women in the 
town.7 This women’s group was then joined by a group of professionals who formed the 
multi-clan Wajir Peace Group (WPG), with members from all clans in the district. They 
facilitated a meeting of clan elders from all the lineages in the district which culminated 
in the Al Fatah declaration, which set out guidelines for the return of peace and future re-
lations between the clans. Other groups also began to form, involving elders and youth, 
while a group of businessmen began raising money for peace activities. 
In April 1994, a new DC was appointed to Wajir, who sought to partner with local 
civic groups and traditional authorities to keep the peace. A rapid response team com-
posed of both government and civic leaders was formed on the assumption that early re-
sponse could prevent many manageable conflicts from spiraling out of control. Disputes 
were handled not according to the letter of Kenyan penal code, but “the Somali way” 
– customary law and blood compensation payment was utilized to manage murders, and 
collective punishment in the form of confiscation of a clan’s cattle until a culprit was ap-
prehended and stolen animals or goods returned. The result was a steady decline in ban-
ditry and crime. While the deeper, underlying conflict drivers were not addressed, at least 
one of the main triggers of communal violence – violent crime – was greatly reduced. 
6  A documentary film entitled “The Wajir Story” was produced by Trojan Horse Productions and commissioned 
by Responding to Conflict.
7  This section draws extensively on Ibrahim and  Jenner (1997).afrika focus — 2008-12 [ 27 ]
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The Wajid experiment in civic-governmental collaboration – or, in some respects, 
government sub-contracting out of key functions to local civic and traditional authorities 
– was formalized via a decision to unite the peace groups as a sub-committee of the Dis-
trict Development Committee (DDC), a forum within the district administration bring-
ing together government and civil society. The Wajir Peace and Development Committee 
(WPDC) was also established in 1995. Chaired by the District Commissioner, it includes 
representatives from the District Security Committee, heads of government departments, 
NGOs, elders, women, youth, religious leaders, the business community, and the dis-
trict’s four MPs. The committee thus forms an umbrella of  different peace activities in 
the district, enshrining civic-local government collaboration while giving official govern-
ment blessing to largely autonomous civic and traditional action on matters normally 
considered core functions of the state – policing, the judiciary (even over capital offenses 
like murder, employing extra-constitutional customary law), and cross-border diplo-
macy, to name a few. In the process, social groups not normally given voice in formal 
government – elders, women, and youth – were accorded a central place in the civic-gov-
ernment collaboration. The WPDC also catalyzed traditional clan elders in the district to 
form a robust ten-man “Council of Elders,” allowing them to routinize communication 
and collaboration. Over time, the WPDC received support from international donors. 
The implications of the WPDC experiment are considered below. Here, several 
points are worth highlighting:
the WPDC was unquestionably instrumental in the remarkable turnaround of  •	
Wajir district from one of the most anarchic to one of the more stable border 
zones of Kenya;  
the WPDC is a model for similar experiments with peace committees through- •	
out other troubled rural areas of Kenya, a policy shift that is now in the proc-
ess of being enshrined in a national policy on conflict management and peace-
building;
crucial to the WPDC’s success was the combined commitment of a top local  •	
government administrator and local civic leaders. The absence of either would 
likely have doomed the WPDC to failure;
the WPDC’s success is also due to the fact that it combines both traditional elders and  •	
civic leadership (professionals, businesspeople, local NGO figures, etc). Though the 
two are often rival sources of non-state authority, the WPDC demonstrates that they 
can work together and that when they do, the partnership is much more effective;
the WPDC’s chief success has been in reducing incidents of violent crime and ban- •	
ditry, and facilitating rapid, effective conflict management response where conflicts 
have emerged;
the WPDC has not, however, been in a position to prevent large-scale communal  •	
clashes (as the following case studies will demonstrate) nor address the under-
lying causes of armed conflict in the region. It is, in other words, more effective 
at conflict management and crime prevention than conflict prevention.afrika focus — Volume 21, Nr. 2 [ 28 ]
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As for the conflict which prompted the creation of the WPDC, relations between the 
Ajuraan and Degodia were stabilized and no armed clashes have occurred between the 
two since 1994. In an effort to resolve the source of the conflict – the MP seat over which 
the two clans fought – the Kenyan government created a new parliamentary constituency, 
Wajir-North, intended to give the Ajuraan their “own” seat in parliament.  This tactic, 
embraced at the urging of many Somali Kenyan politicians, has resulted in Wajir district 
sporting four constituencies: Wajir-North (Ajuraan); Wajir-East (Degodia); Wajir-South 
(Ogaden); and Wajir-West (split between Ajuraan and Degodia). The Ajuraan were split 
over the proposal to assign them a constituency; some worried that the this not only 
failed to address the underlying cause of the conflict – grazing land and access to re-
sources – but actually institutionalized the loss of Ajuraan of land to the Degodia, who, as 
one Ajuraan figure put it to the Kenyan media, “are aliens to the area” (Umar 1997: 18).
The 1992-1993 Wajir conflict left a legacy of secondary conflict issues which were 
not resolved and eventually produced armed clashes between the Ajuraan and Garre in 
2000. The fact that the Garre clan had quietly sided with the Degodia in the 1992 election 
and clashes remained a festering grievance within the Ajuraan; the Ajuraan responded 
by using their new power in Wajir-North constituency to push the Garre out of the area, 
employing the same misuse of administrative (or in this case electoral) units to engage in 
ethnic cleansing that they feared would occur at their expense in Wajir-West. 
In July 2000, clashes erupted between the Garre and Ajuraan in northern Wajir dis-
trict. The clashes were sparked by a spiraling cycle of banditry raids and counter-raids, 
involving as many as 100 armed men and producing 30 deaths.8 The violence continued 
into early 2001, when Ajuraan residents of north Wajir were the victims of a cross-border 
raid, reportedly involving gunman dressed in Ethiopian military uniforms (suspected to 
be Ethiopian Garre). Fifteen villagers died, 3,300 were displaced, and 15,000 cattle were 
stolen and moved back across the Ethiopian border in the attack.9 Garre and Ajuraan 
tensions over grazing land, control of constituencies and locations, and ethnic cleansing 
in Wajir-West were sparked in the latter case by a dispute over a newly declared location 
along the border of Wajir and Mandera districts. Garre clan leaders and administrators 
sought to settle Garre there, while the Ajuraan expected that the location would be theirs 
to govern by dint of their control over Wajir-West constituency. Because the Ires Teno lo-
cation is the site of valuable grazing land, the stakes were high for the two clans, helping 
to spark renewed violence. Adding to the conflict is the fact that the disputed territory is 
adjacent to the Ethiopian border. The two clans (especially the Garre) can call on Ethio-
pian kinsmen for aid against their rivals introduces outside elements into the conflict 
who are not stakeholders in local peace, who are principally motivated by the opportunity 
to loot, and who can return across the Ethiopian border to avoid retaliation or arrest. This 
places the conflict beyond the ability of both the WPDC and the Kenyan government to 
manage. The international or cross-border dimension to the conflict is complicated still 
8  Tervil Okono, “Kenya Clan Fight Leaves 30 Dead,” PANA news service ((July 21 2000).
9  “Life in the Shadow of Bandit Attacks,” Kenyan Daily Nation (January 13, 2001). afrika focus — 2008-12 [ 29 ]
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further by the fact that the Garre accuse the Ajuraan of harboring OLF militia, which the 
Ajuraan deny, but which is likely a factor in Ethiopian government tacit support of or ac-
quiescence to Ethiopian Garre irregulars engaging in the cross-border attacks (Ibid.).
  Promise and Limits of the “Mediated State” 
The development of a government-civic partnership to execute core state functions 
in the Kenyan border area is very significant, not only in the immediate region but also 
as perhaps the most advanced and formalized variation of a broader trend in governance 
by weak states in their frontier areas. This trend has been until recently largely invisible 
to outside observers and remains poorly understood, both in Kenya and elsewhere.10 Ob-
servers are gradually becoming more aware of the new phenomenon, but have struggled 
to explain it and adequately convey its significance. A recent article by Letitia Lawson and 
Donald Rothchild (2005: 228) captures both the new awareness of this trend and the dif-
ficult of translating it into words: 
“Africans have begun moving away from colonially designed juridical statehood to fashion em-
pirical formulas that respond to the messiness of their current realities. Only time will reveal whether 
these new, flexible structures prove an effective response to state weakness.”
In northern Kenya, where communities are further along it this process of fash-
ioning new formulas to respond to the “messiness of their current realities,” observers 
have also struggled to explain exactly the state-civic partnership is and is not, producing 
sometimes clumsy descriptions which tend to obscure and understate the importance 
of this experiment. Some have described it as an “ad hoc” arrangement by local officials 
overwhelmed by borderland lawlessness. Those coming from a peace-building and NGO 
perspective have tended to explain it as local or grassroots movement to which govern-
ment has acquiesced on limited matters of conflict management. Those not following 
developments in the peace-building sector are thus apt to miss it entirely.
It is the conclusion of this study that the governance model being negotiated, imple-
mented, and experimented with in northern Kenya is more than an ad hoc peace-building 
strategy, more than a post-colonial version of “indirect rule,” and more than a convenient 
division of labor between local government, civic groups, and traditional authorities. It is 
better understood as a type of “mediated state,” a concept initially used to explain state-
frontier governance in early modern Europe. Far from being a relic of medieval Europe, 
however, the mediated state model in Kenya today may be at the forefront of an emerg-
ing, largely unrecognized, hybrid form of state-building in weak states.
10  There are several reasons why this is so.  Reliance on non-state sources of governance is viewed  by many observ-
ers as a symptom of state failure, not an emerging mode of governance. Second, it is essentially an indigenous 
process, beyond the purview of most formal state-building projects sponsored by the World Bank and UNDP. 
To the extent that it has been documented, it has tended to be seen through the more limited lens of grass-
roots peace-building. Finally, it transpires in remote, dangerous border areas where few journalists and analysts 
spend time.  afrika focus — Volume 21, Nr. 2 [ 30 ]
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  The Mediated State as Concept and Explanatory Theory 
The concept of the mediated state is rooted in the study of pre-modern and ear-
ly-modern state formation in Europe, where ambitious monarchs with limited power 
were forced to manipulate, maneuver, and make deals with local rivals to their author-
ity. Those rivals, notes Swen Voekel, “often mediated state authority, and did so both 
as over-powerful purveyors of royal prerogatives, as ‘private’ citizens exercising ‘public’ 
jurisdiction, or as members of extra-national bodies like the Catholic Church.”11 This 
produced situations in early modern Europe that sound oddly familiar in contemporary 
Somalia – France, for instance, is described as “a nation characterized by parcellized 
and overlapping jurisdictions, multiple legal codes, and a plethora of internal tariffs and 
taxes” (Ibid.). As such, the mediated state is considered by historians as a major obstacle 
to state-building, a syndrome to be overcome, usually by superior force of arms. Charles 
Tilley observes that European state formation “consisted of the states’ abridging, de-
stroying, or absorbing rights previously lodged in other units.”12 Whether the mediated 
states is in an obstacle to state-building or a possible route to state-building is an intrigu-
ing question in contemporary zones of weak and collapsed state authority.
Though extreme caution must be taken in drawing historical parallels between state 
formation in early modern Europe and contemporary Africa, the general concept of a me-
diated state appears to have some utility in explaining actual politics on the ground from 
Kenya to the DRC to Mozambique.13 In these locations, central governments with very 
limited power rely on a diverse range of local authorities to execute core functions of gov-
ernment and “mediate” relations between local communities and the state. It is usually an 
unspoken strategy, not enshrined in a national policy as may soon be the case in Kenya.14
Until recently, there were compelling reasons why weak African states did not at-
tempt some variant on a mediated state. One reason was ideological – the project of the 
modern nation-state in independent Africa could not accept less than the full range of 
sovereignty and monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within it borders that the 
West and East bloc enjoyed. Modernization theories which infused thinking about po-
litical development were predicated on the “passing of traditional society” and the para-
mount authority of the state; to the extent that customary law was employed in remote 
areas, it was tolerated but not sanctioned by the state, and at any rate viewed as a dying 
11  Swen Voekel, “Upon the Suddaine View: State, Civil Society, and Surveillance in Early Modern England,” Early 
Modern Literary Studies 4, 2 (September 1999), pp. 1-27. Accessed at http://purl.oclu.org/emls/04-2/voekupon.htm 
12  Charles Tilly, “Reflection on the History of State Making” in The Formation of Nation States in Western Europe ed. 
Charles Tilly (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 35. Importantly, the use of coercion by emerging 
states in Europe had the essential secondary effect of consolidating actual administration (as opposed to mere 
warlordism) over the citizenry, in order better to tax it to finance the war efforts. That salutary political effect of 
war-waging is absent in cases like Somalia, where armed conflict is financed largely by a combination of inter-
national funding and pillaging.  
13  To be precise, the mediated state is concentrated in but  not limited to Africa – one of the most routinized forms 
of the mediated state is in Yemen, where the government must work through tribal leaders for access to and 
control of the entire rural northern portion of the country. 
14  “Conflict Management Policy Framework Unveiled,” Peace Bulletin no 5 (Sept. 2004), pp. 1, 3.afrika focus — 2008-12 [ 31 ]
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system to be replaced in due course by the expanding modern state, not as a building 
block for state-building. The other reason, as described by Jeffrey Herbst, is that African 
states – unlike early modern European states – inherited fixed boundaries firmly pro-
tected by international law from encroachment by more ambitious or effective neigh-
bors or break-away secessionists (Herbst 2000). In an earlier period, failure to extend 
and maintain authority in frontier areas risked loss of that territory, leading rulers to de-
vote considerable treasure and manpower to protecting (and expanding) borders. Today, 
African state authorities have in some respects pursued a rational strategy by allowing 
frontier zones to go ungoverned, especially if the frontier has little economic value, the 
cost of establishing rule of law is higher than whatever revenue can be earned from the 
area, the state faces a serious shortage of money and capacity, and negative spillover of 
anarchy in the frontier does not unduly impact the core areas of the state. The result has 
been enormous tracts of territory in the hinterlands of many African states that are in a 
condition of de facto state collapse. The retreat of the state from its frontier areas and the 
armed anarchy which ensued in Kenya in the early 1990s was particularly shocking only 
because it occurred in a “middle-income” country with greater governmental capacities 
than in most of the rest of the continent.  
This explanation for the governance vacuum in African border areas emphasizes 
the role of state indifference or disinterest in border areas, though lack of state capac-
ity is also a factor. But when that “frontier governance” calculus changes – when state 
authorities develop an interest in asserting or reasserting security and rule of law in their 
hinterland, but lack the capacity – conditions improve for an alternative, “mediated state” 
approach.
In the case of Kenya, several factors increased government interest in expanding 
law of rule in its border areas. These included the enormous costs of spillover of crime, 
displacement, and arms flows into the “core” of Kenya from the running sores in its 
frontier area; a sense of professional duty on the part of a small number of committed   
civil servants; pressure to “do something” about the violence and lawlessness in Kenya’s 
borderlands from international donors, the national media, civic groups, and religious 
leaders; and, in the aftermath of multiple terrorist attacks in Kenya in 1998 and 2000 and 
the 9/11 attacks, a heightened security concern that terrorists were exploiting Kenya’s 
porous borders and lawless interior. 
State authorities which are willing but unable to govern their remote hinterland are 
forced to pursue a mediated state strategy, not out of  sudden enlightened appreciation 
for the virtues of civil society and traditional authority, but because it is their only effective   
option, at least in the short-term. This aspect of the mediated state – that it is not a policy 
preference but rather a default position for weak states seeking to promote governance 
and security in its frontier areas – sets it apart from other contemporary forms of state 
“outsourcing” of governance. The key difference is that state’s opting to contract out 
functions to non-state actors (such as corporations operating seaports or non-profits 
delivering social services paid for by the state) usually do so as a matter of public policy 
choice, and ostensibly with the objective of providing the service more efficiently. This is afrika focus — Volume 21, Nr. 2 [ 32 ]
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the choice of a state authority which “has acquired the competence to decide the limits 
of its own competence” (Reinhold 1999: 1). By contrast, a mediated state strategy is the 
recourse of a state authority which lacks options. It has no choice but to work through 
local intermediaries if it is to have even token jurisdiction in an area within its borders.
Sub-contractors, moreover, operate within the legal framework of the state. Sub-
contracting firms and NGOs work for the state. By contrast, local authorities in a me-
diated state arrangement operate beyond the state, its legal code, and its most coveted 
possession – its “monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within its territory.” The 
fact that government-civic partnership in northern Kenya includes implicit government 
acceptance of the application of extra-judicial legal codes by non-state actors and the use 
of local home-guards to employ lethal force in defense of public security is no mere “sub-
contracting” exercise. It is a fundamental revision of basic precepts of sovereign state 
authority; a forfeiting of a state’s claim to “omni-competence” within its borders; a new, 
flexible way to deal with the current “messiness” that conventional inherited political 
structures have had great difficulty managing.
State interest is a necessary but not sufficient condition for mediated governance. 
Whether a mediated state strategy is actually an option then depends on the presence 
of reasonably authoritative local actors which the state can accept (a secessionist polity, 
for instance, would not be acceptable; nor would a liberation or radical movement bent 
on the overthrow of the government or entire political system). Finally, for a mediated 
state strategy to succeed as a peace-building and governance strategy, the sources of local 
authority must be relatively legitimate and committed to peace and good governance, 
not predatory or corrupted local elites. Otherwise, the strategy produces a patch-quilt of 
state-sponsored warlord fiefdoms.
In the case of northern Kenya,  the very fortunate combination of revived customary 
law and role of traditional clan elders and the ascendance of capable, responsible, and 
dedicated civic leadership within the region’s small urban professional provided the ideal 
conditions for a mediated state to work since the mid-1990s.
A hallmark of the mediated state as it evolved in early modern Europe was flexibility 
and pragmatism. State rulers brokered deals with whatever authorities existed in the pe-
riphery of their realm. The approach by definition defies templates and standardization. 
The same characteristic obtains in northern Kenya. There, the types and combinations of 
local actors in peace committees, and the types of relationships developed between these 
local authorities and the state, have varied considerably from place to place.15
By viewing the current government-civic partnership to conduct core functions of the 
state in Kenya’s border areas through the lens of the “mediated state” model, we accord 
this hybrid governance approach the significance it is due. Though its initial purpose was 
to promote peace-building, the mediated state in Kenya has expanded into core functions 
of the state – the judiciary, police, cross-border diplomacy. The Kenyan state is also em-
ploying the approach to promote range-land management (Haro et al. 2005).
15  The range of peace committee models in Kenya is surveyed and assessed in Walker, Ibrahim, and Shurio 
(2003). afrika focus — 2008-12 [ 33 ]
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Because the strategy involves ceding responsibility to non-state actors, it is diffi-
cult to cast this trend as a contribution to “state-building.” But it may well be a form of 
“governance-building.” Since the objective of state-building projects is not to strengthen 
state capacity for its own sake, but rather as a means of promoting good governance, the 
possibility that the mediated state can help promote the latter by by-passing the former is 
an interesting challenge to standard state-building interventions, which tend to conflate 
reviving formal state capacity with promotion of governance.
  The Mediated State and Strategies of Peace-building and Governance-building
The mediated state model is thus a more satisfactory and comprehensive theory to 
explain what is already occurring on the ground in Kenya’s border areas. But it is also 
useful as a state-building strategy? Is mediated governance trend to support and encour-
age, or are criticisms of the approach serious enough to warrant caution? 
There is now adequate documented evidence from northern Kenya to sustain two 
not entirely incompatible claims – first, that the government-civic partnership there has 
unquestionably produced impressive gains in public security and conflict management, 
and second, that the approach has serious shortcomings. The achievements of the medi-
ated state in Kenya’s border areas have been documented above and need not be repeated. 
As for concerns and criticisms, several stand out as especially noteworthy:
Allowing customary law to be applied above the laws of the state by non-state  •	
actors, in which collective responsibility is privileged over individual rights and 
responsibilities and in which not all are equal before the law is a serious ero-
sion of civil liberties, human rights, and rule of law. It is also illegal and extra-
constitutional and cannot be sanctioned by the Kenyan government.
These objections aside, customary law also has a limited reach and is often over  •	
whelmed by the scale of current armed conflicts.
The peace committees serving as umbrella groups for local actors are very  •	
uneven in capacity, lack an independent, sustained flow of resources, and are 
plagued by high turnover. 
Some peace committees are politically compromised and not neutral. •	
No local authorities are in a position to cope with conflicts instigated by power- •	
ful outsiders in Nairobi and elsewhere. 
Some border regions lack the key prerequisite of legitimate, capable local au- •	
thorities and are instead either zones of leadership vacuum or are dominated by 
predatory politicians and warlords.
The entire enterprise of constructing mediated governance in northern Kenya  •	
has been designed to manage conflict, but lacks any real capacity to address un-
derlying causes of armed conflict, which require effective and sustained central 
state engagement.16
16  Several studies provide thoughtful critiques of the strengths and weaknesses of peace committees and the gov-
ernment-civic partnership we are calling a mediated state. See Walker, Ibrahim, and  Shuria (2003); Haro et al 
(2005); Goldsmith (1997), and  Nyunya, Joshua. “Reports by National Experts: Kenya. Conflict Prevention, Man-afrika focus — Volume 21, Nr. 2 [ 34 ]
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The fact that mediated governance is problematic and limited and yet the sole source 
of security in weak state frontier areas makes it the “best of bad options,” a position that 
both its advocates and detractors can share. How then to view the long-term prospects 
of mediated governance? If its shortcomings are intrinsic (legal and human rights objec-
tions, for instance), and if better options are on the horizon, then the only justification 
for support to mediated governance is as a stop-gap measure, designed to provide short-
term improvements in security and conflict prevention. 
If, on the other hand, the prognosis for state expansion and consolidation in the 
border areas of weak states is poor, then a different set of policy considerations emerge. 
In that case the trend toward mediated governance is longer-term in nature, a fact which 
citizens and international observers may not prefer but which is not a matter of prefer-
ence. Realistically, the focus then becomes improving the mediated state as a governance 
and peace-building strategy in frontier zones – taking the rough edges off of a govern-
ance structure that is and will remain flawed and messy. This can be done in a number of 
ways. First, support to peace committees (or whatever other permutation of local author-
ity emerges by district) is vital if they are to be sustainable. Training and financial support 
for appropriate operational expenses are two of the most important types of support. 
Recognition is also important – these are mainly voluntary efforts, by civic figures willing 
to put themselves in harm’s way in very difficult circumstances. Second, external efforts 
can help to harmonize, at least partially, the inconsistencies between customary, sharia, 
and national legal codes.17 Clarification of the jurisdiction of customary law is also es-
sential – is a Kenyan Somali living in Nairobi subject to xeer, the Kenyan legal code, or 
both?
Importantly, the mediated state as peace-building and governance-building strategy 
offers opportunities to international aid agencies, not merely Faustian choices. In the 
past, agencies engaged in “capacity-building” frequently found themselves working at 
cross-purposes. Projects building capacity of local civic and non-governmental organiza-
tions was viewed by other actors has working against state-building, by diverting human 
resources, money, and roles to non-state actors. This debate over whose capacity is being 
built has plagued governance projects in Somalia, Kenya, and elsewhere for years. In a 
mediated state, however, there is no contradiction between improving the governance 
capacity of non-state authorities in border area and simultaneous efforts to build formal 
state capacity. One is part of a short to medium-term governance and peace-building 
strategy, the other is part of the long-term state-building project which, under the right 
agement, and Resolution: Capacity Assessment Study for the IGAD Sub-Region.” Leeds: University of Leeds, 
Centre for Development Studies, October 2001).
17  A few analysts and organizations have recently produced excellent reports calling for “harmonization” of tradi-
tional/informal and formal governance in the Somali judicial sector; this is an especially important topic in any 
discussion of a mediated state because almost all justice in Somalia is meted out via non-formal mechanisms 
(customary law and blood payments, or sharia courts). See Andre Le Sage, “Stateless Justice in Somalia:  Formal 
and Informal Rule of Law Initiatives,” (Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, January 2005), and Puntland 
Development Research Centre, “Pastoral Justice: A Participatory Action research Project on Harmonization of 
Somali Legal traditions: Customary Law, Sharia, and Secular Law” (Garowe Somalia: PDRC, 2002).afrika focus — 2008-12 [ 35 ]
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circumstances, may eventually displace mediated governance. Whether mediated gov-
ernance is in fact an interim strategy or part of long-term alternative form of governance 
in parts off Africa and the developing work is a decision which citizens of these states 
must make for themselves.
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